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It  is  often  said  that  you  won’t  get  rich 
working for the government, but you can’t 
beat the benefits. One form of these ben-
efits is “Other Post-Employment Benefits” 
(OPEB),  which  represent  government 
promises  to  employees  to  provide  health 
care and other non-pension benefits after 
retirement.  Government  employers  com-
monly use these benefits to attract talent 
in lieu of large salaries or bonuses and to 
provide future security to employees. Un-
til now, governments have also been able to 
apply preferential accounting treatment to 
OPEB plans, which allowed deferral of the 
costs of today’s promises into the future.
However, due to a standard issued by 
the  Governmental  Accounting  Standards 
Board (GASB) in June 2004, this is about to 
change. This standard, GASB 45, requires 
clear and transparent reporting of the cur-
rent value of OPEB promises in state and 
local government financial statements. For 
New England state governments, this to-
tal value will be in the tens of billions of 
dollars.  While  implementation  of  GASB 
45 may cause the financial picture of some 
governments to suddenly appear dim, the   
standard is in fact only illuminating an ex-
isting situation.
The way things were
In the world before GASB 45, governments 
were not required to measure and report 
the long-term implications of OPEB prom-
ises.  Related  expenses  were  recognized 
when retirees received benefits, not when 
benefits were granted and earned. Under 
this system, commonly referred to as “pay-
as-you-go,” the government recorded an ex-
pense each year equal to the annual premi-
um or benefit payments made to retirees. 
Given the continuing trend of growing re-
tiree pools and rising health care costs, this 
practice resulted in a reported cost that was 
lower than if benefit expenses had been re-
corded as earned.
Because  this  accounting  method  pro-
vided no incentive to set aside current funds 
to meet the growing demands of these ben-
efits, it quietly shifted the true burden of 
payment to future generations. This burden 
would rest not only with future employees, 
who might see reduced benefits, but also 
with communities, which could see services 
cut or taxes increased to cover growing ben-
efit payments. Allowing tomorrow’s citizens 
to pay for the retirement of today’s workers 
is inconsistent with the GASB concept of 
inter-period,  or  inter-generational,  equity. 
By changing the accounting for these plans, 
GASB hopes to “foster improved account-
ability and a better foundation for informed 
policy decisions.”1
Learning to speak the language
GASB 45 is an accounting standard, not a 
law, and does not mandate how a govern-
ment conducts its operations. However, by 
changing the way OPEB plans are reported, 
it provides new and valuable information to 
decision-makers. A few concepts are helpful 
to understand the newly provided informa-
tion and the influence it might have.
The Unfunded Actuarial Liability
Prior  to  the  issuance  of  GASB  45,  many 
governments did not know the value of the 
OPEB  promises  they  had  made  to  their 
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employees. Future costs may have been only 
roughly estimated or not calculated at all, re-
sulting in a foggy picture of the value of ben-
efit promises. That fog is gradually clearing 
as governments take the first required step to 
comply with the standard, which is to hire an 
actuary to calculate the cost of benefits that 
have been promised to and earned by employ-
ees to date.
The actuarial calculation factors in, among 
other things, participant characteristics, plan 
provisions, and assumptions regarding health 
care cost increases, retirement age, and life 
expectancy. After factoring in the many vari-
ables, the calculation applies a discount rate 
to the future costs in order to determine their 
value in today’s dollars. Their present value 
is then reduced by the actuarial value of any 
plan assets that have been legally segregated 
for plan use.
The Annual Required Contribution (ARC)
While the Unfunded Actuarial Liability must 
be disclosed, the standard does not require 
that it be immediately recognized as a liabil-
ity and expense in the financial statements. 
Instead, the liability is recognized gradually, 
over a period not to exceed 30 years. In each 
year following implementation, an allocation 
of the Unfunded Actuarial Liability for that 
year, combined with the additional actuarially 
determined incremental cost for maintaining 
the  plan  provisions  for  that  year,  will  com-
prise the ARC. Despite the use of the term 
“required,” the standard does not actually re-
quire funding of the ARC; it is required only 
if a plan wishes to be considered fully funded 
for the plan year.
The  ARC,  which  will  drive  the  annual 
cost  recorded  on  government-wide  finan-
cial  statements,  will  be  significantly  higher 
than the current annual cost. Consider the 
example of Maine, which, under the current 
pay-as-you-go method, has recorded an aver-
age annual increase of 16 percent in OPEB 
costs over the five-year period ending June 
30,  2006.  If  the  state  were  to  implement 
GASB 45 for fiscal year 2007, the state’s ad-
ditional reported cost increase from 2006 to 
2007 could be anywhere from 302 percent to 
569 percent.2 While this increase may seem 
severe, the range is not atypical of reported 
OPEB cost increases that states all across the 
nation are expected to face.
The Net OPEB Obligation
For each year that a government fails to make 
contributions that are at least equal to the 
ARC, the Net OPEB Obligation will increase 
by the shortfall. The growth of this obligation 
on government balance sheets will be a clear 
indicator to users of financial statements that 
the government is not keeping up with what 
the GASB has deemed to be an appropriate 
funding schedule for these benefits.
Picking up the pieces
Since the amount of the Unfunded Actuarial 
Liability depends upon both promises to em-
ployees and assets designated to fund these 
promises, governments have a variety of op-
tions to manage the liability. These options 
include changing the benefits provided to re-
tirees, pre-funding with additional asset con-
tributions, and utilizing a combined approach. 
Of course, governments could also operate as 
if nothing has changed, although ignoring the 
liability will only facilitate its growth.
Can you take it back?
The  liabilities  now  being  determined  are 
large because the promises made have been 
large and have only been exacerbated by med-
ical inflation and longer retirement periods. 
Among the New England states alone, ben-
efit payments per eligible retiree in 2006, re-
corded on a pay-as-you-go basis, ranged from 
approximately $3,300 for Maine to $11,000 
for  Connecticut,  according  to  the  states’ 
Comprehensive  Annual  Financial  Reports. 
These reported figures, which are representa-
tive of current health care costs and retiree 
pools, are only expected to increase under the 
new standard.
Attempting to scale back these promises 
may prove difficult or even illegal, since post-
retirement benefit modifications may be pro-
hibited by state constitutions or statutes, as is 
the case for Connecticut, Massachusetts, and 
Maine. Benefit promises also may be support-
ed by employment contracts or case law, and 
even absent legal enforceability, governments 
will still need to be sensitive to obligations 
to employees. The Executive Director of the 
Government Finance Officers Association has 
noted that it “would be inequitable to expect 
hard-working government employees alone to 
shoulder the full burden of potential changes 
in plan design in the form of decreased or 
eliminated benefits.”3
If allowable, governments may consider 
some forms of benefit modification, including 
reducing overall benefit levels, increasing the 
threshold for employees to qualify for ben-
efits,  increasing  retiree  contribution  rates, 
or reconsidering spousal coverage. Some may 
even consider discontinuing coverage for in-
coming  employees,  discontinuing  coverage 
entirely, or converting the plans to defined 
contribution plans.
To fund or not to fund
Given  the  difficulties  in  attempting  to  re-
duce benefits, governments may instead look 
at funding possibilities to manage their Un-
funded Actuarial Liability. While legally seg-
regating assets sufficient to cover future plan 
obligations  would  eliminate  the  Unfunded 
Actuarial Liability entirely, governments are 
more likely to take a gradual approach. When 
a government commits to making scheduled 
contributions at least equal to the ARC each 
year, the plan is considered pre-funded under 
GASB  45.  While  pre-funding  will  mean  an 
additional strain on current resources as pay-
ments are made, contributions in excess of 
annual benefit payments can be invested in 
order to fund future liabilities. Actuarial cal-
culations for plans that meet annual funding 
targets will use a discount rate based on the 
long term investment rate, which is higher 
than  the  short-term  discount  rate  used  for 
plans  without  pre-funding.  This  will  result 
in a smaller Unfunded Actuarial Liability and 
calculated ARC. Figure 1 shows the impact 
of pre-funding for three New England states 
that have made publicly available the actuar-
ial calculations of their liability under various 
funding scenarios.
In  an  environment  where  expendable 
resources  are  already  scarce,  finding  assets 
to pre-fund these plans may be difficult or 
require  especially  creative  thinking.  Massa-
chusetts has proposed using a portion of its 
tobacco  settlement  proceeds  to  reduce  its 
liability.  Other  states  could  consider  fund-
ing options that might be less obvious and 
could  include  more  drastic  policy  changes, 
such as selling or leasing assets or privatizing 
certain government functions to raise funds. 
Governments with limited assets may also ex-
plore the possibility of issuing taxable bonds 
to fund the liabilities. However, in doing so, 
they should carefully consider any associated 
risks, including whether the returns obtained 
on bond proceeds exceed the interest paid 
and keep pace with rising plan costs.
When a government is unable to commit 
to meeting annual funding targets equal to 
the  ARC,  partial  contributions  or  contribu-
tions  that  gradually  approach  the  ARC  can 
offer some benefit, in the form of a blended 
discount rate, without overextending the gov-
ernment’s resources. A government may also 
decide that pre-funding at any level is not a 
feasible option in light of other demands on 
limited resources. Rhode Island, for example, 




Figure 1. Current value of projected unfunded actuarial liability 
Note: Calculations use the following discount rates for unfunded and funded plans, respectively: 4.5% and 8.25.% for 
Massachusetts, 3.75% and 8.0% for Vermont, 4.5% and 7.5% for Maine
Source: 2006 Massachusetts Comprehensive Annual Financial Report; State of Vermont BuckConsultants Presentation, 

















sbacco  settlement  bond  issuances  towards  a 
2008  budget  deficit  rather  than  previously 
planned OPEB contributions. While a govern-
ment can choose not to pre-fund, that deci-
sion will yield a growing liability under GASB 
45, as the unfunded portion of the ARC is 
added to the balance sheet liability each year. 
Those governments will need to keep a close 
watch on the size of the liability and develop a 
sustainable plan to meet the cash obligations 
as they come due.
Moving forward
With no clearly preferable method of dealing 
with OPEB liabilities, the key for decision-
makers is to consider the needs of all inter-
ested parties, the availability of resources, and 
potential areas for negotiation. This will not 
be easy. Employees are counting on receiving 
promised benefits, government agencies may 
resist budget cuts, and citizens will likely be 
reluctant to pay increased taxes to cover these 
costs. Given the importance of bond issuances 
for funding, governments should also consider 
how credit agencies will react to their chosen 
approach. While credit agencies are unlikely 
to ignore the absolute size of the liabilities, 
it has been emphasized that “how the liabil-
ity is managed, along with a government’s ca-
pacity to fund these obligations on an annual 
basis—either on a pay-as-you-go or an accrual 
basis—will be an important element of the 
credit review.”4
In anticipation of its 2007-2008 fiscal year 
effective  date  for  the  largest  governments, 
New England states are taking action to pre-
pare for implementation of GASB 45. Howev-
er, the challenges related to OPEB plans span 
beyond simply complying with the standard’s 
reporting and disclosure requirements. In the 
nearly three years since it was issued, GASB 
45 has placed pressure on governments to re-
evaluate OPEB plans and to identify resources 
that can be set aside to fund them. While this 
process has begun, additional discussions and 
many difficult choices still lie ahead and will 
likely continue well into the future.
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